Flexibility of deployment: challenges and policy options for retaining health workers during crisis in Zimbabwe by Mashange, Wilson et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
Flexibility of deployment: challenges and
policy options for retaining health workers
during crisis in Zimbabwe
Wilson Mashange1*, Tim Martineau2 , Pamela Chandiwana1, Yotamu Chirwa1, Vongai Mildred Pepukai1,
Shungu Munyati1 and Alvaro Alonso-Garbayo2
Abstract
Background: Zimbabwe experienced a socio-economic crisis from 1997 to 2008 which heavily impacted all sectors.
In this context, human resource managers were confronted with the challenge of health worker shortage in rural
areas and, at the same time, had to operate under a highly centralised, government-centred system which defined
health worker deployment policies. This study examines the implementation of deployment policies in Zimbabwe
before, during and after the crisis in order to analyse how the official policy environment evolved over time,
present the actual practices used by managers to cope with the crisis and draw lessons. ‘Deployment’ here was
considered to include all the human resource management functions for getting staff into posts and managing
subsequent movements: recruitment, bonding, transfer and secondment. The study contributes to address the
existing paucity of evidence on flexibility on implementation of policies in crisis/conflict settings.
Methods: This retrospective study investigates deployment policies in government and faith-based organisation
health facilities in Zimbabwe before, during and after the crisis. A document review was done to understand the
policy environment. In-depth interviews with key informant including policy makers, managers and health workers
in selected facilities in three mainly rural districts in the Midlands province were conducted. Data generated was
analysed using a framework approach.
Results: Before the crisis, health workers were allowed to look for jobs on their own, while during the crisis, they
were given three choices and after the crisis the preference choice was withdrawn. The government froze
recruitment in all sectors during the crisis which severely affected health workers’ deployment. In practice, the
implementation of the deployment policies was relatively flexible. In some cases, health workers were transferred to
retain them, the recruitment freeze was temporarily lifted to fill priority vacancies, the length of the bonding period
was reduced including relaxation of withholding certificates, and managers used secondment to relocate workers
to priority areas.
Conclusion: Flexibility in the implementation of deployment policies during crises may increase the resilience of
the system and contribute to the retention of health workers. This, in turn, may assist in ensuring coverage of
health services in hard-to-reach areas.
Keywords: Appointment, Bonding, Deployment policies, Reappointment, Rural areas, Secondment, Socio-economic
crisis, Training, Transfers, Zimbabwe
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Introduction
Scaling up the healthcare workforce as well as improving
distribution, management, performance and quality were
solutions proposed to address human resources for
health (HRH) crisis in the last decade [1, 2]. The inequit-
able distribution of HRH, especially between urban and
rural areas, and the problems related to filling posts in
remote areas have been identified as barriers in the
provision of healthcare and the achievement of the
health-related Sustainable Development Goal [3]. This is
particularly prevalent in post conflict and crisis-affected
settings [4, 5].
Much research has already been devoted to under-
standing health worker (HW) behaviour in relation to
taking up and remaining in posts in rural/remote loca-
tions [6, 7]. Additionally, research has shown that the
problem of mal-distribution of HRH is often made worse
by the mismanagement of deployment systems [8, 9].
The term ‘deployment’ is frequently used in relation to
distribution of staff, but rarely defined. More specifically,
deployment is defined as ‘the movement of staff from
one’s current assignment to another, to meet operational
needs’ [10] or simply ‘the transfer of a person from one
position to another’ [11]. In this study, however, we de-
fine deployment as a ‘bundle’ of human resource man-
agement functions for getting staff into posts and
managing subsequent movements including recruitment,
reappointment, bonding, secondment and transfer [12].
Within a country’s healthcare system and regulations,
each of these human resource management (HRM)
functions is governed by a set of policies which are
sometimes official and explicit, but in other cases, they
remain unwritten rules. In this paper, we explore the of-
ficial policies and the informal practices that rule deploy-
ment of HWs in Zimbabwe, with the aim of reviewing
the changes in deployment policies and the implementa-
tion practices during the crisis and post-crisis periods.
Zimbabwe experienced a decade of severe economic,
social and political crisis between 1997 and 2008. The
crisis led to a reversal of gains made in key health indi-
cators including immunisation, maternal mortality or in-
fant mortality [13–16] and had an important impact on
the health workforce. While out-migration of HWs was
reported before 1997 [17, 18], it increased substantially
during the crisis leaving the staffing situation severely
deteriorated with high vacancy rates which peaked be-
tween 2008 and 2009 reaching up to 43% [13, 15, 19].
Prior to 2005, the health services in Zimbabwe were
delivered through facilities run separately by govern-
ment, faith-based organisations (FBOs) or private sector.
Government hospitals and primary healthcare facilities
are managed either by the Ministry of Health and Child
Care (MOHCC) or Ministry of Local and Urban Devel-
opment [20]. The Zimbabwe Association of Church
Related Hospitals manages church-related health pro-
viders in coordination with the MOHCC particularly for
issues related to their workforce. The majority of FBO
facilities operate in rural settings [21] while government
run facilities cover both urban and rural areas.
In 2005, Government of Zimbabwe decided to unify
health services provided by both government and FBOs.
The Health Services Board (HSB) was established
through the Health Act of 2004 which resulted in both
government and FBO health service providers being
under one central authority. Due to the enactment of
the Health Services Regulations (HSR) in 2006, the de-
ployment of government HWs employed in government
and FBO facilities should be managed by MOHCC
through the HSB. However, implementation of the new
policy was uneven. Service contracts between MOHCC
and FBOs were not implemented in all provinces simul-
taneously [14] which resulted in the uneven adoption of
the terms comprised in the new regulation [22] particu-
larly in those related to staff recruitment and deploy-
ment by health services managed by FBOs. This
retrospective study looks at changes in deployment pol-
icies and practices in Zimbabwe’s health sector during
the pre-crisis period (1980–1997), crisis period (1997–
2008) and the post-crisis period (2009–2013).
There is little evidence of flexibility of these policies
and practices in time of conflict or crisis [23] with the
exception of post-conflict Timor Leste [24, 25]. This
study sought to contribute to this evidence.
Methods
This retrospective qualitative study was undertaken in
two healthcare providers (FBOs and Government) in
three largely rural districts in Zimbabwe where imple-
mentation of deployment policies and practices was ex-
plored. Data was collected through interviews with key
informants involved in policy development and with
managers and HWs involved in their implementation.
Narratives about the life of HWs were used to generate
data about the impact that changes in HRH deployment
systems and practices have on their professional trajec-
tory and experiences [26].
A total of 76 documents were extracted from pub-
lished and unpublished literature and analysed using
content analysis to explore the evolution of deployment
policies including the rationale for changes.
The study focuses on four main HRM functions re-
lated to deployment: recruitment, bonding, transfer and
secondment. We define recruitment as the process of
attracting the right people and selecting and offering
employment to the best candidates. We have also in-
cluded here appointment, which in this study refers to
the allocation of a position to a HW when entering the
health workforce for the first time. We consider bonding
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as the formal agreement with the government compris-
ing compulsory service that newly graduated HWs who
were beneficiaries of public financial support for their
studies agree to provide after graduation to compensate
for the government’s investment. Transfer in this study
refers to the process of moving HWs from one post to
another and secondment, which is often considered as a
modality of transfer, refers in this study to the temporary
transfer of workers to another post for a limited period
for a specific reason.
The study was undertaken in three largely rural districts
of the Midlands province. The districts are referred to nu-
merically in this paper as districts 1, 2 and 3. The major
providers of healthcare in the selected districts are govern-
ment and a large FBO which owns 52% of the faith-based
hospitals in the country (Table 1). Government-run facil-
ities in this study are comprised of those managed by HSB
and rural district councils (RDC).
A total of 17 key informant interviews (KIIs) from na-
tional and local levels for both government and FBOs
were purposively selected according to their knowledge
and experience of policy development relating to deploy-
ment (Table 2).
The overall manager and the officer responsible for
HRM including deployment at facilities were selected in
each study district for interviews and asked questions
mainly about deployment practices. A total of 11
in-depth interviews (IDI) were carried out at both gov-
ernment and FBO institutions (Table 3).
A total of 67 interviews with midwives, nurses and en-
vironmental health practitioners (42 females and 25
males) working in the three different sectors with differ-
ent lengths of service (11 < 5 years; 56 ≥ 5 years) were
conducted (Table 4) using the ‘life history’ technique to
elicit their views and perspectives [26].
Separate topic guides for semi-structured interviews
for each group were developed and used flexibly as a
guide for the interviewer allowing for new emerging the-
matic areas introduced by interviewees. The interviews
for the KIIs lasted an average of 25 min while those for
managers and health workers interviews with life histor-
ies lasted between 30 and 45 min. During data collection,
researchers met on daily basis to discuss the emerging
themes assessing whether research questions were being
answered. Saturation was achieved with the initially
planned interview schedule with no need for further
additional interviews [27]. All interviews were tran-
scribed verbatim and checked for accuracy by a second
transcriber. Transcriptions of the combined set on inter-
views were analysed using a framework approach [28]. A
coding framework was initially developed based on the
document review, key research questions and new
themes emerging during the analysis were added. All
transcriptions were coded using the developed coding
framework. The data was managed using NVIVO quali-
tative analysis software version 10.
Results
Recruitment and appointment
Initial policies and further adaptations
Recruitment in Zimbabwe is regulated through the Pub-
lic Service Regulations (PSR), 2000 sections 2 and 3/1a-d
[29]. These policies envisage that recruitment should be
merit-based on the applicant’s knowledge about their
tasks and their ability to perform them. Appointments
can be either under ‘indefinite pensionable conditions’
or ‘temporary’ to fill casual vacancies or supernumerary
posts. All appointments should follow principles of
equality of fair competition among candidates and need
to be included in the Estimates of Expenditure approved
by the Ministry of Finance each fiscal year. To confirm the
suitability of new workers, they need to go through a pro-
bation period which initially was not less than 1 year after
which and, if satisfactory, appointment was confirmed.
With the introduction of HSR 2006, recruitment re-
sponsibility for the health sector was shifted to the HSB
[22]. Besides merit, HSR 2006 introduced criteria of pro-
fessional and moral standing and considered apprentice-
ship for individuals less than 18 years (previously not
allowed under PSR 2000) as legal to allow health profes-
sional students to undertake their required internships
to complete their studies. In order to address the high
attrition from the public to the private sector observed
after Independence, the new regulation provided greater
flexibility for dual practice allowing HSB to authorise
specific workers to devote part of their time to private
practice and reducing the minimum probation period
from 1 year to 6 months.










District 1 80 351 6 4 6
District 2 175 835 10 1 15
District 3 576 362 11 9 26
Total 27 14 47
Source: compiled from MoHCW Health Facility List 2010/ ZIMSTATS 2012
Census Report
Table 2 Number of key informant interviews
Organisation/sector Sample by gender Sample
totalMale Female
Public sector/HSB 8 3 11
FBO 0 3 3
Health professional associations 2 1 3
Totals 10 7 17
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Implementation practices
During the pre-crisis period, HWs would search for jobs
on their own after training.
From 1992 to 1995 I did my nursing training as an
RGN at Harare central hospital […] we were not
being deployed. Each person would look for his/her
own place (HW Gvt District 3).
Before the crisis, recruitment of students was done by
the relevant health service providers (government or
FBO), drawing from their own training schools, but it
was carried out in accordance to the MOHCC/HSB
standards and criteria. Despite being regulated by the
same framework, church-run nursing schools had the
opportunity to retain the nurses they like at their facil-
ities after completion of training:
…the DNO [District Nursing Officer] will deploy
them to us but [the nurse training school] can just say
we need three here [at FBO facility] and they can even
mention names preferably so and so […] (Manager
FBO District 1)
However, during the crisis period (1997–2008), they
had the option to choose three priority provinces, both
for students who had trained in government and in
FBO-run training schools. Preference listing was with-
drawn during the crisis period for nurses and paramed-
ical staff mainly to address the shortage of HWs
particularly in rural areas. On the other hand, doctors
were still allowed to choose, although the human re-
sources (HR) department at MOHCC head office would
intervene to ensure even deployment in areas where
majority of newly qualified doctors would have chosen
one hospital.
Most people (80%) would choose Harare and only
20% would choose Bulawayo but it was supposed to
be 50-50. This meant that 30% of those who chose
Harare were then forced to go and work in Bulawayo.
To solve the issue there was a list that would come
from the head office Human Resources Directorate of
who would go where. (Manager Gvt District 1)
Despite the establishment of the HSB which, in the
views of the government, aimed at the unification of all
health services, there were some differences in the im-
plementation of HSR 2006 between government and
FBO service providers. Some managers reported having
two different and parallel processes for recruiting new
workers: one triggered by the HSB and another one by
the specific FBO:
When we are recruiting [under the FBO process] we
advertise the posts, and then people apply. When they
are sent by the DNO [official HSB process] we just
accept them. We sit down with them and do a bit of
an interview but not as we do with those we recruit
on our own because there is no option to say we want
you or we don’t because the person would have been
already sent to us. We then ask them to fill the
assumption of duty forms and other forms which are
needed. (Manager FBO District 3)
These overlapping recruitment systems with different
degrees of thoroughness in terms of merit-based selec-
tion may have resulted in different recruitment outputs
Table 3 Distribution of IDIs with facility managers by sector and gender
Sector Districts Grand
totalsDistrict 1 District 2 District 3
Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total
HSB 0 3 3 1 1 2 0 2 2 7
FBO 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 4
Totals 1 3 4 2 1 3 1 3 4 11
Table 4 Distribution of IDIs with HWs by sector and gender
Sector Districts Grand
totalsDistrict 1 District 2 District 3
Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total
HSB 7 3 10 9 6 15 3 6 9 34
FBO 4 1 5 6 2 8 7 2 9 22
RDC 1 1 2 3 2 5 2 2 4 11
Totals 12 5 17 18 10 28 12 10 22 67
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with a fairer system applied to these recruited through
the FBO system (e.g. using interviews) as compared with
these recruited through the HSB which may be more
prone to patronage and weaker accountability. However,
this was not substantiated by the study.
Another factor that contributed to the poor staffing
situation during the crisis was the recruitment freeze in-
troduced as a response to an over-inflated civil service
[30]. However, given its key role and its already precar-
ious staffing situation, the freeze in the health sector was
temporarily relaxed to allow for limited recruitment on
a periodical basis to cover urgent needs [20]. This af-
fected equally government and FBO-run facilities.
When we have people, who qualify we wait for the
unfreezing of posts. The HR [department] will allocate
the posts to the provinces and provinces allocate to
the districts. (National Manager Gvt)
During the crisis, the number of absconders (i.e.
workers leaving the workforce without prior notice or
authorisation) increased substantially. While before the
crisis the process of re-appointment of absconders was
long and often unsuccessful, this was adjusted after the
crisis to allow for fast-tracked re-appointment to miti-
gate the increasing vacancy rate.
A new cadre, a primary care nurse (PCN), was intro-
duced during the crisis to resolve staff shortages in rural
areas and this cadre was meant to work at rural health
centres/clinics only.
In hospital [District Hospital] it [introduction of
PCNs] did not help in any way, but it helped in the
rural areas, that cadre was meant to work in the rural
areas. They are not supposed to work at district
hospitals or other upper hospitals. (Manager Gvt
District 2)
Bonding
Initial policies and further adaptations
Bonding policies were first adopted in Zimbabwe
through the “Health for All Action Plan” in 1986. Ini-
tially bonding arrangements were between MOHCW
and professional associations [13, 17, 31] by which all
new HWs were to serve generally in the public sector
for a period equivalent to the period of their training.
However, bonding was not mentioned in the PSR 2000
or in the HSR 2006. This policy gap may be the cause
behind recent research showing inconsistent implemen-
tation of this specific policy element [20]. New regula-
tion was introduced in 2007 by which all newly
graduated nurses had their certificates withheld until
they completed their bonding obligations. However, after
the introduction of the recruitment freeze and the sub-
sequent difficulties for new professionals in finding a job
in the public sector, the regulation was not enforced
from 2010.
Implementation practices
Before the crisis, bonding regulations were well enforced
with bonding playing a dual role: improving retention
and providing a supervised induction after the training.
Long back it [bonding] was there to retain nurses as
the nurses were trained using public funds. It was also
used to make sure that the nurse will be moulded
through the supervision by the senior [staff] during
the bonding period. (Provincial Manager Gvt).
There was change in bonding policy in 2007 when it
included withholding of certificates to mitigate the in-
creasing attrition from the public to the private sector
and through out-migration. Bonding rules were the same
for staff working in both government and FBO sectors
especially after the creation of the HSB.
The nurses were bonded for a period equivalent to
the training period and you would not get certificates
for the three years you are bonded. (Provincial
Manager Gvt)
There were some exceptions in the application of
bonding rules within the FBO sector for ordained staff
who are directly managed by the church authorities
through internal church policies
Like after the training we used to know that a person
will be bonded for a year before he/she can say I no
longer want to be here, but for us, sisters [ordained
staff], that rule doesn’t apply, we stay at a place until
we are told to move. (HW Gvt District 2)
The introduction of the recruitment freeze led to dis-
continuation of withholding of certificates as the govern-
ment could no longer guarantee employment to new
graduates.
At the moment because of the shortage of vacancies
and the freezing of posts, the nurses are now being
given their certificates immediately after qualifying.
(Provincial Manager Gvt)
Bonding for in-service training, particularly after the
crisis, was perceived as fairer than for pre-service train-
ing, as it was reported by many HWs as a way of giving
back to the system what the system invested in their
education:
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It is good in the sense that you would have been sent
by the facility, so you have to render back the service,
if you think of going somewhere it would not be fair
that after training you will just go without rendering
the service. (HW Gvt District 3)
Transfers
Initial policies and further adaptations
Before 2006, transfer of civil servants was regulated
through section 13 of PSR 2000. The policy reflects a
compulsory top-down approach to transfer, for example
stating, ‘a member may at any time without his consent
be transferred by the Commission or a delegated author-
ity from the post which he occupies to any other post in
the Public Service whether the post is inside or outside
Zimbabwe’ (page 16). Refusal to obey an instruction of
transfer is treated as an act of misconduct. However, the
regulations say that transfer should be planned to min-
imise discomfort to the member concerned and their
family and that the member should be provided with all
necessary information relating to the transfer and noti-
fied in time. Transfers cannot be used as a punitive
measure except in cases of disciplinary procedures.
The PSR 2000 was replaced by HSR 2006 and in
the new regulation the length of a temporary posting
was left to be determined by the HSB as opposed to
the initial transfer for a limited period of maximum
3 years.
Implementation practices
During the pre-crisis period, managers were more in
control of the processes of transferring workers, but dur-
ing the crisis, due to substantial problems with attrition,
they were less eager to allow transfers of staff.
…as an HOD [Head of Department] I just realize that
if someone moves away there will be less [fewer]
nurses here so I might refuse the person to move to
another facility. (Manager Gvt District 3)
These circumstances made it difficult for managers to
deploy staff in a way that would improve geographical
coverage. Managers also needed to balance carefully the
requests from workers willing to be transferred as re-
fusals may trigger greatly needed HRH to withdraw, ab-
scond and go to private sector or leave the country.
Transfers were easy during the crisis because there
were more vacancies than HWs seeking those
posts. One [a manager] had to be reasonable; it
was either you let the cadre transfer to a preferred
post or the system will lose the cadre altogether.
(Manager Gvt District 1)
In this regard, workers were allowed to transfer only
when they found another worker in a similar position
willing to exchange/swap positions.
[…] when I tried to talk to the DNO that I want to go
to XXXX [Province] I was told that I should seek for
a lateral transfer. I should convince somebody who is
at a facility where I want to go so that he will come
here, and I will go there. (HW Gvt District 1)
Secondment
Initial policies and further adaptations
The PSR 2000 states that a worker may at any time, with
his/her consent and at the invitation of head of Ministry
or the Commission, be seconded (a temporary form of
transfer) by the Commission for a period not exceeding
3 years to a post in an approved service. Terms and con-
ditions of services for seconded workers should be gov-
erned by the contract between the worker and the
service concerned. The HSR 2006 revision points out
that the period of secondment will be determined by the
HSB without his/her consent while the rest of the terms
and conditions are as stipulated by PSR 2000.
Implementation practices
During the crisis, because of the challenges of transfer-
ring staff explained above, managers used secondment
to fill vacant posts, but it was unpopular among HWs as
the legal terms for secondment were not appropriately
applied. In some cases, HWs were seconded for a longer
period of time than stipulated and sometimes communi-
cation about the secondment was not provided timely
and it was not clear:
I heard that the first group volunteered but as for our
group we did not volunteer we were told to go. We
were just told that you are going tomorrow, and we
were not prepared to go. We could not even give
excuses we were just told to go (HW FBO District 3)
Some key positions within the FBO health services
such as medical doctors were historically staffed through
internal church-related networks and were never made
explicit and included in the Public Service staffing
norms when the HSB was introduced. During the crisis,
when even FBO facilities faced problems with mobilisa-
tion of resources from external sources, many FBOs
found themselves with shortage of this specific cadre. In
these cases, secondment was used to allocate physicians
to these facilities.
My post is at XXX District Hospital [HSB]. When I
came into the district, mission hospitals did not
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have posts for doctors from the government, so I
was seconded here at XXX Hospital [FBO].
(Manager FBO District 1)
Discussion
This study was designed to review the changes and flexi-
bility in deployment policies and the implementation
practices during the crisis and post-crisis periods in
Zimbabwe. Much of the response to the crisis and
post-crisis situations relating to deployment was in the
implementation of policies and in particular to transfer
and secondment. The pragmatic response of the
district-level managers was to be flexible in the use of
the transfer rules aiming more at retaining HWs than to
ensure equitable staffing of health facilities. Here, flexi-
bility was used in a positive way, though elsewhere flex-
ible interpretation of rules may be seen as negative [32].
However, secondment was used as an alternative and
temporary way of filling vacancies. The aim of this, in
the view of managers, was to at least retain staff. Inter-
estingly, while we found that secondment (also known
as deputation in some organisations) was driven by man-
agement in our study, elsewhere it is frequently used by
employees as a means of changing their place of work
through “side payments” to managers [33].
Several changes in the broader context that were
highly relevant to understand the evolution of HRH de-
ployment were identified. The first was the desire to im-
prove equitable access to health services by bringing in
and coordinating the then well-resourced FBO facilities
in line with government plans and funding. The intro-
duction of a blanket recruitment freeze for the Civil Ser-
vice represented a major challenge for district- and
facility-level health service managers, particularly in
rural areas. However, the system managed to mitigate
some of the constraints by allowing flexibility on its im-
plementation like temporarily lifting the freeze to allow
recruitment and appointment for critical positions. Such
exemptions for doctors and nurses were used during a
lengthy recruitment freeze in Zambia in 2002 and 2004
[9]. Similarly, the policy on bonding was changed during
the crisis and post-crisis periods, with for example the
bonding period for nurses going from 3 to 2 years. With
such a big staff shortage and a fluid labour market, the
government could not afford to drive people away from
the sector, so understandably they became more lenient.
When even the reduced period of bonding was not be-
ing accepted by workers, the government initially used
the common strategy of withholding graduation certifi-
cates during the bonding period [34] but following the
recruitment freeze when jobs could no longer be guaran-
teed both the bonding policy and the policy of withholding
of certificates were relaxed which also shows the flexibility
of the system.
On the other hand, the actions—or to some extent the
lack of action—of policy makers in a crisis such as that
experienced in Zimbabwe can be (at least partially) ex-
plained by the fact that it was difficult or impossible for
them to predict how long the crisis would last, and,
based on that, it was difficult to decide what changes to
make to deployment policy even when the health work-
force was clearly haemorrhaging.
While the changes in response to the crisis in
deployment-related policy might have been limited, ad-
justments and adaptations at the practice level, in par-
ticular in relation to transfer and secondment, were
more prominent. In particular, the relaxation of transfer
rules at the height of the crisis and the tactical use of se-
condment demonstrated the ability of managers’ flexibil-
ity in implementing policy—what Bossert [35] refers to
as ‘decision space’—and to carry out actions to achieve
their objectives, which in this case were to retain staff
and to fill vacancies. Nevertheless, the bonding policies
were clearly adapted at various stages of the crisis and
post-crisis periods in response to the changing labour
market situation. The shift on the policy of reappoint-
ment was clearly triggered by the window of opportunity
as HWs who had left the sector were beginning to re-
turn in view of the apparent improvements in the overall
situation. The timing of this window was fortunate, as
such opportunities may be quite delayed as found by our
research colleagues in Sierra Leone [36].The introduc-
tion of the PCN was also timely as it made sure posts
were filled in rural areas. However, no official changes in
the transfer and secondment policies were made specif-
ically in response to the crisis and post-crisis situation.
Though the deployment objectives might have been
achieved reasonably successfully in the short term, the
actions of FBO managers of preventing HWs from
transferring and of government managers to force staff
into short-term secondments meant that in the longer
term staff in both cases may have left at the first oppor-
tunity. Hence, the longer-term objective of retention
would not have been achieved, illustrating the challenge
of developing coherent HR strategies [37, 38]. In these
situations, managers should be supported to take the ini-
tiative to solve problems but should also be supported in
understanding both the short- and longer-term implica-
tions of HRM actions.
An ironic finding of this study is that although the re-
forms enacted through the Health Services Act of 2004
created a centralised system, in the context of crisis,
district-level managers were able to push their degree of
‘decision space’ [39]—or ‘room for manoeuvre’—more
than in some stable but supposedly decentralised con-
texts [40, 41] with regard to staff deployment. In the
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absence of a central response to deployment policy, this
must be seen as positive behaviour. However, without
support on effective HRM, some decisions made run the
risk of having negative longer-term consequences. This
finding is an essential lesson for Zimbabwe as it deals
with the aftermath of the peak of the economic crisis, as
well as potentially for other countries facing similar situ-
ations. The policy should acknowledge that decision
space must be increased for deployment managers in
underserved rural areas. There were some limitations to
this study. Documentation on policies and interviews
with high-ranking key informants was difficult to obtain.
Also, different accounts of the implementation of the
policies were given between managers and between
health workers. However, triangulation of data types and
sources was used to ensure the credibility of the find-
ings. We had initially planned to measure the impact of
changing policies using routine staffing data. However,
this was not finally possible as data was not available at
the national level and insufficiently complete in the
study districts to provide a representative sample across
the categories of HWs. Nevertheless, the multi-method
approach of this study allowed for qualitative data gath-
ered through interviews with key informants, managers
and staff—in particular the life histories [26]—to provide
insights on the changing staffing situation. The ‘unique-
ness’ of the situation in Zimbabwe makes these results
very specific and therefore not directly transferable, but
they add to the knowledge about how deployment policy
and practice is or is not responsive to particular crises.
How the crisis affected other HR policy and practice may
be different and could be the subject of further study.
Conclusion
Flexibility in implementing deployment policies is vital es-
pecially during changing conditions created by crisis in
order to improve system responsiveness, retain HWs and
manage their inequitable distribution in urban and rural
areas. Managers at facilities and in provinces must be
given mandate and support to be able to implement the
policies for the interest of the HWs and facility at large.
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